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itself recognized this.9 In the Myers case, a postmaster of the first class
was appointed for a term of four years with no other qualifications on his
removal,' 0 while removal of the director of the Tennessee Valley Authority
was qualified by an enumeration of specific bases for action by Congress
and the President." Thus, while the only specified ground of removal in
the Myers case was the expiration of the official's term, the officer in the
instant case was, in addition, subject to removal in a specific way and for
a specific cause.
From a comparison of the cases, it seems that an officer whose duties
are mainly executive may be removed at any time by the President, no
matter what qualifications be placed by Congress on the removal of that
officer. J. E.
CONTRACTS-LEGALITY OF CONTRACTS FOR LOBBYING SERvicEs-[Federal].
Plaintiff sued in contract to recover for services rendered in lobbying for a
bill which Congress eventually enacted. Plaintiff, who had been paid $500
per month for his expenses and services, sued for an additional $10,000
which he claimed as additional compensation agreed upon by defendant in
event of his success in securing the enactment of the bill. Defendant denied
liability on the ground that the contract was illegal. It was proved that
plaintiff had used his personal influence with certain legislators, and had
promised certain Senators that he would exert political influence for them
in their home states, Held, that the contract was a lobbying contract and
was, therefore, unenforceable. Ewing v. National Airport Corp.,
The courts have said that lobbying contracts are invalid if they have
the slightest tendency to induce acts injurious to the public interest or wel-
fare. To be held void, it is not necessary that the contract stipulate for
corrupt or immoral action, such as bribery.2 The evil seems to lie in the
secrecy of private solicitation intended to influence action on the part of a
legislator in a manner and at a time that makes it impossible for opposing
views to be presented.3 A contract to pay for such services is void.4 This
9. The court said, "between what was decided in the Humphrey case, and
what was held in the Myers case, there still remains a field of doubt, and
* * * cases falling within it must be left for future consideration and de-
termination as they arise." Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority (C. C. A.
6, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 990, 992.
10. Act of July 12, (1876) 19 Stat. 78, 80, c. 179, 39 U. S. C. A. (1928)
sec. 31.
11. See Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933) 48 Stat. 60, 63, c. 32, 16
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) secs. 831c, 831e. These sections provide that the
directors may be removed (1) by a concurrent resolution of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, (2) by the President for violation of the pro-
vision prohibiting appointment of employees on the basis of their political
affiliation.
1. (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 859.
2. Adams v. East Boston Co. (1920) 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628.
3. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 281.
4. Providence Tool Co. v. Norris (U. S. 1864) 2 Wall. 45; Trist v. Child
(U. S. 1874) 21 Wall. 441; Marshall v. B. & 0. Ry. (U. S. 1853) 16 How.
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type of contract is, however, to be distinguished from a contract for prose-
cuting a claim or presenting and arguing for a bill before a legislature o14
its committees. Such services may consist of drafting a petition, collecting
facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing before
a committee or other proper authorities.5 There is little doubt that such
a contract is valid and in no way repugnant to public policy.6
There is a conflict on the question whether a provision for a fee con-
tingent upon the enactment of legislation invalidates a soliciting contract.
Some courts have held unequivocally that, if the contract is one in which
compensation is contingent upon success, it is void as against public policy.
7
Other courts have held that, if nothing improper or immoral was contem-
plated, the fact that the compensation was to be contingent, does not in
itself render the contract illegal.8 It would seem that, in the absence of
statutes to the contrary, the latter view is the better. Where the contracV
contemplated nothing objectionable, and where there is no evidence of im-
proper conduct in its performance, it would seem more just to enforce the
contract than to declare it void on the ground that the contingency might
tend to induce secret and unfair solicitation. As was pointed out in one
case,9 no one questions the right of an individual to act in his own behalf
in such matters, even though he would be induced more strongly to use
improper methods than an agent, working for a mere fraction of the bene-
fits resulting from his services.
314; Noonan v. Gilbert (App. D. C. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 775; Gesellshaft Fur
Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H. v. Brown (App. D. C. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 410.
See Note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 157; Note (1930) 67 A. L. R. 685.
5. See Trist v. Child (U. S. 1874) 21 Wall. 441.
6. Martin v. Street Improvement Dist. (1928) 178 Ark. 588, 11 S. W.
(2d) 469; Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1927) 200 Cal. 318, 253 Pac.
726; Kemble v. Weaver (1925) 200 Iowa 1333, 206 N. W. 83; Smathers v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders (1934) 113 N. J. Law 281, 174 Atl. 336;
Herrick v. Barzee (1920) 96 Ore. 357, 190 Pac. 141; State ex rel. Hunt v.
Okanogan County (1929) 153 Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31, 67 A. L. R. 668.
7. Noonan v. Gilbert (1934) 63 App. D. C. 30, 68 F. (2d) 775; Chrichfield
v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co. (1898) 174 Ill. 466, 51 N. E. 552, 42 L. R.
A. 347; Coquillard v. Bearss (1863) 21 Ind. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 362; Haulton
v. Dunn (1895) 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, 30 L. R. A. 737, 51 Am. St.
Rep. 493.
8. Wylie v. Coxe (U. S. 1853) 15 How. 415; Wright v. Tebbitts (1875)
91 U. S. 252; Stanton v. Embrey (1876) 93 U. S. 548; Stroemer v. Van
Orsdel (1905) 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. W. 1053, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212, 121
Am. St. Rep. 713; Herrick v. Barzee (1920) 96 Ore. 357, 190 Pac. 141;
Stansell v. Roach (1923) 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520, 29 A. L. R. 143;
State ex rel. Hunt v. Okanogan County (1929) 153 Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31,
67 A. L. R. 668. In Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H. v.
Brown (App. D. C. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 410, the court made a distinction
between contracts for contingent compensation for prosecution of a debt or
individual claim against the government, and contingent contracts for pro-
curing favors from heads of the government or the procuring of general
remedial legislation, authorizing or granting advantages to which, prior to
enactment, the contractor had no existing legal claim. The former type of
contract was declared to be valid, while the latter was not.
9. Stroemer v. Van Orsdel (1905) 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. W. 1053, 4 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 212, 121 Am. St. Rep. 713.
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Under the facts of the present case, the court's decision was consistent
with prevailing law. Plaintiff's conduct in using his personal influence with
the legislators was quite enough to justify the decision. While it is possible
to contract legitimately for services to be rendered before a legislature on
behalf of a claim or bill, it is essential that one use the utmost care in
drafting and performing such a contract. J. W. F.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF CASE Olt
CONTROVEESY-THREAT TO ENFORCE ALLEGEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
-[Federal].-The Southern Pacific Company sought a declaratory judg-
ment against the Attorney General of Arizona, individually, to the effect
that the Arizona Train Limit Law was in violation of the Federal Con-
stitution. The complaint alleged that defendant had said that it was his
duty as attorney general to prosecute plaintiff for any violation of this law.
Defendant denied the allegation and stated that he would not attempt to
enforce the statute until he had decided that it was constitutional. The
court made a finding of fact in favor of defendant. Proceedings were dis-
missed by the district court for want of jurisdiction, no case or controversy
within the judicial power of the United States having been presented. The
circuit court of appeals affirmed the dismissal and held, that there was no
case or controversy. Southern Pacifi Co. v. Conway.,
The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act gives to the federal courts the
power to issue declaratory judgments "in cases of actual controversy except
with respect to federal taxes * * *.2 The limitation of the power to cases
of "actual controversy" means that it pertains to "cases" and "contro-
versies" in the constitutional sense.3 The Declaratory Judgments Act has
not changed the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is merely a pro-
cedural statute, providing remedies in cases where jurisdiction already
exists.4
In a suit between a private party and a state officer for a judgment
declaring a statute unconstitutional, there is a sufficient controversy when
the officer expresses an intention to enforce an act alleged to be uncon-
stitutional and capable of causing irreparable injury to the plaintiff. The
officer may be sued in a federal court as an individual.5 But when the
officer has given no indication of his intent to enforce the act, and has done
nothing to place himself in a position adverse to the plaintiff, by the weight
1. (C. C. A. 9, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 746.
2. (1934) 48 Stat. 955, c. 512, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 400.
3. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (1937) 300 U. S. 227.
4. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles (C. C. A. 4, 1937) 92 F. (2d)
321; John P. Agnew & Co. v. Hoage (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 349;
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm. (App. D. C. 1938) 101
F. (2d) 426; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thompson (D. C.
S. D. Iowa 1940) 32 F. Supp. 15.
5. Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249; Currin v.
Wallace (1939) 306 U. S. 1; Chester C. Fosgate Co. v. Kirkland (D. C. S. D.
Fla. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 152; Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. (C. C. A.
5, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 145; Black v. Little (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 867; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse (1937) 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. (2d) 341.
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